题 目：Spillover Effects of Trolls-Initiated Patent Litigation

报告人：Feng Chen(陈峰)，加拿大多伦多大学UTM/Rotman商学院,副教授

时 间：2019年3月18日（星期一），15：00-16：30

地 点：嘉庚二203室

主持人：杜兴强 教授

参 加 者：对会计、财务研究有兴趣的师生

论文摘要：In this study, we employ proprietary patent litigation data during the period between 2000 and 2017 and analyze the potential spillover effects from patent-infringement litigation. We develop a framework to identify technology peers at risk of patent litigation (at-risk peers), if the firm uses technologies similar to that of the litigated patent. First, we find that the propensity of at-risk peers being sued by non-practicing entities (“NPEs” or “patent trolls”) increases in the year subsequent to a defendant firm being sued by an NPE in patent litigation. Second, we find that when a firm is sued by NPEs, its at-risk peers are also experiencing significant negative market reactions and market-value losses around the litigation filing date. Moreover, we show that the projected propensity to be sued based on prior data (i.e., the “hazard” of being next to be sued) is an important determinant of the negative market reactions observed for at-risk peers. In addition, our difference-in-differences tests indicate that state-level anti-troll laws mitigate the spillover effects exerted by NPE patent litigations. Finally, we document significant spillover effects for technology peers associated with NPE litigations that are not subsequently sued for patent infringement and such firms report lower operating performance following NPE litigations. Overall, our findings indicate that costs associated with NPE litigations go well beyond existing and future defendant firms.