“厦门大学会计学科教师与研究生系列Seminar”之三

发布者:gulei 发布时间：2017-03-22 10:36:38 浏览数： 次 [ 返回 ]

为了活跃厦门大学会计学科的学术研究氛围，激发既有教师与在校研究生的学术研究热情和积极性，促进教师之间、教师与研究生之间、研究生彼此之间的深入交流、思想碰撞与知识分享，我们组织了由厦门大学会计学科的常任教师、博(硕)士研究生、国际访问学者等作为报告人的系列Seminar。该Seminar将冠以“厦门大学会计学科教师与研究生系列Seminar”的总标题，从2017年3月14日起，每周周二下午15:00-17:30举行。该Seminar与已有的“财务、会计Seminar”(主要聘请校外与境外的学者担任报告人) 相互补充，以期能够更好地推动厦门大学会计学科的学术发展。

题 目：CEO Severance Pay and Corporate Tax Planning

报告人：郑祯 助理教授

主持人：张国清 教授

时 间：2017年3月28日(星期二)，15:00-17:30

地 点：厦门大学嘉庚一409室

论文摘要： We examine the association between CEO severance pay (i.e., payment the CEO would receive if s/he is involuntarily terminated) and corporate tax planning activities. We find that CEO severance pay increases corporate tax planning activities, consistent with CEO severance pay offering contractual protection against managers’ downside risk and thereby inducing managers to engage in optimal tax planning. Further, CEO severance pay provides stronger tax planning incentives in situations where we expect the downside risk protection provided by severance pay to matter more – when CEOs are otherwise more risk averse and when CEOs are more likely to bear downside risk. Finally, we find that CEO severance pay reduces firms’ cost of equity capital, suggesting that investors perceive the tax planning taken by managers to reduce agency costs and increase firm value. Overall, our results suggest that CEO severance pay provides tax planning incentives and contributes to shareholder value.
http:/uploadfile/2017/0322/20170322103747232.pdf