财务、会计seminar第一百三十期讲座通知
题目：Does Audit Transparency Improve Audit Quality and Investment Efficiency?
演讲者：Yun Zhang Associate Professor
Department of Accountancy, George Washington University
时间：2016年10月17日（周一）上午 10：00 - 11:30
地点：嘉庚二205
主持人：郑祯 助理教授
参 加 者：对会计、财务研究有兴趣的师生
简介：We examine effects of disclosing precisions of audit opinions (i.e., enhancing audit transparency) on auditor quality and investment efficiency in a setting where the usefulness of an audited
financial report is jointly determined by the quality of the underlying financial reporting (i.e., a mapping from a firm's fundamentals into an unobservable true accounting signal), misreporting of the true signal by the firm's manager, and audit quality (i.e., the precision with which audit evidence collected by the auditor correctly captures the underlying true accounting signal and hence uncovers managerial misreporting). In our model, the auditor exerts an unobservable effort to in fluence audit quality and is motivated by liability in the event of an audit failure. We show that while higher transparency enhances the information decision usefulness of audited financial reports for investors, it can also adversely affect the auditors incentives and consequently lower the expected audit quality and investment efficiency. We show that the underlying quality of financial reporting is an important determinant for this tradeoff, and the case for audit transparency is weaker when the underlying financial reporting quality is high. Our findings also imply that the underlying financial reporting quality and auditing regulations are two interconnected elements. That is, whether increasing the underlying
financial reporting quality has a favorable effect on audit effort and investment efficiency depends on the auditors disclosure requirement, and
whether expanding the scope of auditors' communication is desirable depends on the
underlying reporting quality.
http:/uploadfile/2016/1008/20161008083712327.pdf
http:/uploadfile/2016/1008/20161008083712813.pdf
